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IS HOBBY LOBBY A TOOL FOR LIMITING
CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
Jennifer S. Taub ∗
Critics lament that with Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
1
Inc., the Supreme Court further expanded corporate personhood
powers. This Article offers an alternative reading. It suggests that
Hobby Lobby might actually provide a tool for limiting previously
recognized corporate constitutional rights. To those who oppose
the decision, this assertion might seem unduly optimistic. After
all, the Court did determine that three family-owned business
corporations were “persons” with sincere religious beliefs entitled
2
to use the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) to
deprive employees of federally mandated healthcare insurance
coverage. Given that the Court determined that certain “closely
3
held” business corporations possessed statutory rights previously
thought reserved to real human beings, it would not seem to
presage the future restriction of corporate constitutional rights.
However, by designating (thus far) just closely-held corporations
as persons with free-exercise rights under RFRA the Court invites
us to question whether other corporations (that lack similar
attributes) would be denied such personhood. And, if so, whether
a distinction between closely-held corporations and others could
be applied to curtail corporate constitutional rights.

∗ Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. I would like to thank John Coates for
the invitation to the November 7, 2014, “Advancing a New Jurisprudence for American
Self-Governance” symposium co-sponsored by Harvard Law School and Free Speech for
People, as well as the other organizers, panelists, and participants. I am also grateful for
comments and suggestions from Caroline Corbin, Ron Fein, Michelle Harner, Heidi
Kitrosser, Tamara Piety, Elizabeth Pollman, and Jasper Tran, and to Jill Hasday and Tom
Boyle for coordinating this Constitutional Commentary symposium issue. I would also like
to thank the members of the University of Illinois School of Law community who provided
feedback during a faculty workshop on March 10, 2015, and organizers, panelists, and
participants at the University of Maryland, Francis King Carey School of Law symposium
on “The Impact of the First Amendment on American Business,” held on March 27, 2015.
1. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
2. Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
3. 134 S. Ct. at 2769.
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Determining how Hobby Lobby restricts corporate
personhood rights is not a mere thought experiment. It has
become immediately necessary as a practical matter. Because the
4
Court held that the contraceptive mandate under the Patient
5
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) as applied to the
three corporate litigants violated RFRA, the Department of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) was obligated to fashion an
exemption for them and similar organizations. Yet,
notwithstanding the apparent importance of the term to its central
holding, the Court majority failed to define what it meant by a
6
7
“closely-held corporation.” Moreover, there is no uniform state
or federal law defining this now critical category. Further, the
decision seemed to discourage “discriminating” between classes
8
of corporate entities. Wrestling with this apparent indefiniteness,
HHS sought through a proposed rulemaking to create a
diagnostic test (what I will refer to as a type of “Hobby Lobby
Tool”) to identify the circumstances when business corporations
could become eligible for the exemption from the contraceptive
mandate.

4. See infra Section I.
5. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119, 42 U.S.C. § 18001.
6. Anne Tucker, No Clear Lines in the Sand, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (June 30, 2014),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/06/no-clear-lines-in-the-sand.html;
Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, THE RISE OF
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (forthcoming 2015) (on file with the author) (“although
the Court extensively relied on the ‘closely held’ terminology in seemingly cabining its
holding, the Court never defined this term for its purposes and no singular definition exists
in corporate law to clearly limit the scope of Hobby Lobby’s reach”).
7. Approximately twenty states and also the District of Columbia have statutes that
provide for the “close corporation” form. 1 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CORP.
FORMS ANN. § 6:22 (5th ed. 2015). In those states that do not have statutory close
corporations, business corporations can often structure themselves to be a “close
corporation,” however, what that entails can vary from state to state. See F. HODGE
O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, 1 CLOSE CORP. AND LLCS: LAW AND PRAC. § 1:19
(3d ed. 2014); see also Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory, supra note 6 (while there is no
“singular definition . . . [i]t is typically understood to refer to a corporation with a small
number of shareholders whose shares are not readily transferable and who are often
involved in managing the corporation”).
8. The Court suggests that no distinction should be made between one type of
corporation and another. “No known understanding of the term ‘person’ includes some
but not all corporations. The term ‘person’ sometimes encompasses artificial persons (as
the Dictionary Act instructs), and it sometimes is limited to natural persons. But no
conceivable definition of the term includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but
not for-profit corporations.” (134 S. Ct. at 2769). In addition, the majority did not close the
door to publicly traded corporations claiming to be persons for purposes of RFRA.
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The Hobby Lobby majority opinion does provide some
9
guidance. The Court’s threshold determination that the three
corporations were persons under RFRA appears to have
depended upon the existence of three conditions. First, upon
10
looking through the corporate entity, the Court was able to see
human owners that were co-extensive with the corporation. This
move ignored the “separateness” that state corporate law
11
recognizes between a corporation and its owners. Second, it
appears that only because the identified human owners held (or
agreed to share) the same sincere religious beliefs, and third,
openly ran the corporation in accordance with those beliefs, did
the Court conclude the beliefs of these human beings could be
12
attributed to the corporate entity. Arguably, only with these
three factors present, did the Court determine that the
contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the sincere
religious beliefs of each corporation. The majority opinion,
written by Justice Samuel Alito, suggests that to be deemed a
person under RFRA, a corporation would not need to be closely
held. Thus, so long as each of these three conditions was met a
corporation could be considered a person under RFRA.
13
Conversely, not all closely held corporations could meet the test.
9. Many corporate law scholars have studied the opinion seeking guidance to
distinguish between those business corporations that could or should have free exercise
rights. See, e.g., Brett McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, Minnesota Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 14-39, at 1, 6 (Oct. 22, 2014) (After contending that “Where
religious beliefs shape a corporation’s purposes, the protections of RFRA may rightly
apply,” the author suggests a framework. “The framework considers two dimensions:
organization and ownership. Along each dimension, a corporation can vary from no to
high religious commitment. Ownership looks to the number and concentration of
shareholders and the degree to which they share strongly held religious beliefs.”), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2513380 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2513380.
10. The Court also looked through trusts for Mardel and Hobby Lobby to see the
owners.
11. The Court has previously recognized the separateness of the corporation and its
owners. See, e.g., Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001)
(Justice Breyer for the majority wrote: “the employee and the corporation are different
‘persons,’ even where the employee is the corporation’s sole owner. After all,
incorporation’s basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights,
obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who
created it, who own it, or whom it employs”); United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51
(1998) (corporate parent entity separate from subsidiary).
12. Cf. Lyman P. Q. Johnson & David K. Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby,
70 BUS. LAWYER 1, 16–17 (2015) (“The Court thus upheld the institutional heft of the
corporation as a distinct person under RFRA, and did not simply disregard it making it
indistinguishable from its human participants.”).
13. Cf. Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 184 (2014)
(“Despite the fears that were voiced on this issue during the litigation, the Court did not
do for the Free Exercise Clause what Citizens United did for the Speech Clause, although
nothing in the majority’s opinion suggests that it would not do so in the proper case . . .
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Evidence of the first condition can be found in Justice Alito’s
explanation that rights arising from the designation of a
corporation as a fictional person were designed to protect the
rights of real human beings associated with the entity. Depending
upon the nature of the statutory or constitutional right, his
opinion acknowledged that some, but not all, such rights derived
14
from looking through the entity to the owners to find such
human beings deserving of protection. For other rights, he
indicated that the Court might look around to protect a wider
15
group of stakeholders. Justice Alito noted that corporate free
exercise rights were designed to protect “the religious liberty of
16
the humans who own and control those companies.” Given this
17
framework, it seems that looking through to the owners to find
an identity of interest with the corporate entity is a necessary, but
insufficient condition. Further evidence from the opinion also
suggests that the aforementioned second and third conditions—
that the owners shared the same, or agreed to share the same
despite the possible ramifications of the opinion, the Court does not extend its holding
beyond closely held corporations”).
14. Vincent S.J. Buccola, Corporate Rights and Organizational Neutrality, IOWA L.
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (“When the Court ascribes to corporations a right otherwise
attributable to natural persons, it typically invokes a version of the ‘aggregate’ theory as
justification.”).
15. Note that corporate law scholars are accustomed to inconsistency in how the
Court sees corporate identity. See Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups:
Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 883 (2012) (“[T]he argument
made here is not for convergence in perspectives on corporate groups across all areas of
law. Rather, it is that in different areas of law, theories of the corporation, and, by
extension, of corporate groups can be used to evaluate or legitimate particular legal
rules”); Buccola, supra note 14, at 3–4 (“Over the course of two hundred years, the Court
has articulated inconsistent and mutually incompatible theories of the corporation,
theories which seem to yield predictably unpredictable judgments about the existence of a
corporate right . . . Apparently incompatible conceptions of the firm might feature, without
comment, in a single opinion. In Hale v. Henkel, for example, the Court held that
corporations may not invoke the fifth-amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but
also that they may rely on the fourth amendment’s protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”); Charles R.T. O’Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of
Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation After First
National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1348 (1979) (The Court lacks “any expressly
enunciated common rationale [in cases concerning corporate rights]. Many cases appear
to involve an ad hoc determination rather than the development or application of a general
principle”); Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate
Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (“the Court has not
carefully analyzed its legal theory of corporate rights, nor has it expressly articulated a
framework for thinking about corporations that could guide its decision making in a
consistent way”).
16. 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
17. Note that Justice Alito alludes to the improbability of institutional owners
meeting the second condition (agreement to run the corporation under the same religious
beliefs), thus indicating that perhaps exclusively human owners is not necessary.

IS HOBBY LOBBY A TOOL_FINAL DRAFT III (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

7/8/2015 10:56 AM

CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

407

religious beliefs, and agreed to run the corporation openly
according to those beliefs—would also need to be present in order
18
to treat a corporation as a person under RFRA.
Based upon this understanding of Hobby Lobby, this Article
contemplates whether the three putative preconditions to finding
corporate statutory free exercise rights could be adapted for a
constitutional rights context. Given that the Court has not yet
found that corporations have free exercise rights under the First
Amendment, we would need to look for another illustration. A
suitable example would be a Supreme Court decision in which
corporate constitutional rights were recognized based upon
looking through the entity to the owners. The reasoning in such
an opinion should be reexamined to determine whether the Court
did, should have, or might in the future apply a Hobby Lobby
Tool. In other words, we could inquire whether recognition of the
look through right should depend upon the existence of the
second and third conditions (relating to consent, control, and
public notice). If so, then that corporate personhood right might
also be limited to entities with identifiable human owners that
share (or agree to share) the same perspectives related to the
exercise of that right and to openly disclose those views.
An ideal case to revisit—that recognized a look-through-to19
owners-derived constitutional right—is Citizens United v. FEC.
In Citizens, the Court greatly expanded corporations’ rights to
20
engage in political spending when it struck down provisions of
21
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) that were
designed to limit corporate influence on federal elections. Justice
Anthony Kennedy reasoned that corporations were associations
22
of individuals, and therefore those individual human beings
should not lose their constitutional rights simply because they
joined together as owners to form a corporation. Perhaps, the
Hobby Lobby decision (which came down four years later)
marked a shift in the Court’s reasoning concerning conditions
necessary for corporations to gain look-through derived
18. Evidence can be found where Justice Alito notes that an agreement among
shareholders “to run a corporation under the same religious beliefs” would be necessary
should a non-closely held corporation seek the same protection under RFRA.
19. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
20. See id. at 886 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990), which held “that political speech may be banned based on the speaker’s corporate
identity”).
21. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
22. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904, 907–08; see also id. at 925, 928–29 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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personhood rights. If so, a future federal or state law limiting
corporate political spending to those entities that meet conditions
similar to the three from Hobby Lobby might be upheld.
Successful use of a Hobby Lobby Tool to craft new campaign
finance laws might allow citizens through our representative
government to once again place meaningful limits on the power
of large publicly held business corporations to influence elections.
Toward examining whether Hobby Lobby could be used to
restrict corporate political spending rights, this Article will cover
the following territory. First, it will review the Hobby Lobby
decision. Next, it will show how we can identify the three
conditions that were instrumental in the majority’s finding that
business corporations could exercise religion as persons under
RFRA. The Article will also examine the proposed post-Hobby
Lobby rulemaking by HHS. In particular, it will review three
comment letters submitted by separate groups of law professors
that recommend how HHS could decide when business
corporations should (and should not) be treated as persons
23
entitled to the exemption from the contraceptive mandate.
Thirdly, this piece will revisit Citizens United to apply a
Hobby Lobby Tool by proposing the conditions that should be
present for a corporation’s political spending to be protected
under the First Amendment. This could include (1) look through
24
to identify human owners; (2) notice and consent of the owners
to engage in particular political spending; and (3) public
disclosure of the spending. A new statute that made such elements
preconditions to engaging in corporate political spending or in
receiving an exemption from a general prohibition on corporate
political spending could be upheld. In addition to aligning with
Hobby Lobby, such a law could be viewed as acceptable under
Citizens United. The preconditions could be seen as appropriate
“procedures of corporate democracy” that the Court in Citizens

23. See Letter from Law Professors to Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
Department of Health and Human Services on Comment on the Definition of “Eligible
Organization” for Purposes of Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the
Affordable Care Act [File Code CMS-9940-P] (Oct. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Law Professors’
Comment Letter on Definition], available at https://web.law.columbia.edu
/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/prpcp_comments_on_proposed_regs_corp
_law_profs_for_submission.pdf.
24. As discussed herein, such consent might be on a majority, supermajority, or
unanimous basis.
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sanctioned, designed to mitigate the agency problem that arises
25
from the separation of ownership from control.
Finally, this Article will identify problems that would stem
from reliance on a Hobby Lobby Tool to curtail corporate
constitutional rights. To begin, it leaves in tact the questionable
conclusion from Hobby Lobby that a business corporation is a
person with sincere religious beliefs with statutory (and potential
constitutional) free exercise rights. In addition, the described
analysis would not apply to those corporate constitutional rights
that are not dependent upon look through. Also, treating
shareholders as “owners” and conflating owners with the
26
corporation is contestable as a legal and policy matter. We
should be concerned that the First Amendment could be used to
27
undermine or evade regulation and to intrude upon workers’
28
autonomy and freedom. Such actions impacting the public
should not be acceptable simply because of shareholder consent.
Thus, cutting back to a slight degree corporate political spending
29
would not address broader and more pernicious problems.
Moreover, this approach concedes too much ground, given the
relatively recent recognition by the Supreme Court of corporate
30
First Amendment rights. Further, there are more direct critiques
25. The majority also noted that there was “little evidence of abuse that cannot be
corrected by shareholders ‘through the procedures of corporate democracy.’” Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
26. LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 47 (2012).
27. See Tamara R. Piety, Why Personhood Matters, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 361
(2015).
28. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate
Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2015) (“In
holding that an employer’s religious objection can override the essential rights of its
employees, the decision represents a judicial revival of corporate paternalism, potentially
subjecting millions of American workers to restrictions that had seemingly been eliminated
long ago by our elected representatives.”).
29. John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data,
and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 269 (2015) (“The corporate takeover of the
First Amendment is at its heart the use by elite members of society of specific legal tools
to degrade the rule of law.”).
30. Id. at 229, 240 (“[N]one of the corporations in existence at the time the First
Amendment was adopted was legally authorized to engage in speech as a business activity,
particularly political speech. Newspapers—which if organized as corporations would have
been so authorized—by virtue of their very purpose, were not organized as
corporations. . . . The Supreme Court did not rely on the First Amendment to strike down
a law of any kind until 1931—that is, 140 years after the First Amendment was adopted,
and no federal law until 1965.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Extension of the
individual freedom of conscience decisions to business corporations strains the rationale
of those cases beyond the breaking point. To ascribe to such artificial entities an ‘intellect’
or ‘mind’ for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality.”).
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of Citizens United 31 that could be used to “overturn” the decision,
restore campaign finance limits, and/or justify public funding of
elections, as well as fend off growing attempts to use the
“personhood” label to rollback regulation in the area of public
32
health, welfare and safety. Finally, relying on a Hobby Lobby
Tool could result in the expansion instead of the contraction of
corporate constitutional rights. Perhaps rights previously denied
to corporations due to being personal in nature could now be
expanded due to look through treatment.
I.

THE HOBBY LOBBY DECISION

The Hobby Lobby case arose from objections by three
family-owned businesses to compliance with the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 on the grounds that
certain provisions violated each corporation’s (and their
respective owners’) rights under Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993. The ACA requires most employers with fifty or more
employees to provide in their group health insurance plans
“minimum essential coverage,” including “preventative care and
screenings” for women. Such plans must furnish this preventative
care without imposing upon employees any “cost-sharing
33
requirements.” The ACA did not list the preventative care that
must be covered, but instead empowered a division of HHS to
identify such essential coverage. Under this authority, HHS issued
rules requiring covered employers to provide as part of the
“preventative care,” twenty methods of contraception, each of
which have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(the “contraceptive mandate”). Included were two types of
emergency contraception (sometimes referred to as “the morning
after pill”) and two types of intrauterine devices (“IUDs”).
34
Despite medical opinion to the contrary, many religious
31. ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S
SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 9, 10 (2014).
32. Piety, supra note 27; Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of
Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 97–98 (2014) (“Corporate constitutional litigation is
pervasive. . . . Those constitutional claims have little in common with each other, but just
those examples indicate the sheer breadth and importance of corporate constitutional
litigation.”).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (2010).
34. Jen Gunter, The Medical Facts About Birth Control and Hobby Lobby – From
an OB/GYN, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Jul. 6, 2014) (While some religious conservatives
define pregnancy as beginning at the moment of fertilization, the medical community
considers implantation in the uterus as when pregnancy begins. The morning-after pills
and IUDs work to either prevent ovulation or fertilization. Only one of the IUDs could,
under rare circumstances, also prevent implantation).
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conservatives asserted that each of these methods acted to end
pregnancies instead of simply working to prevent them.
Built into the initial regulations was a narrow exemption
from the contraceptive mandate for churches and other religious
orders. Later, HHS provided an accommodation for other
religious nonprofit organizations that had religious objections to
the mandate. The accommodation required the elimination by the
insurance provider of the objectionable contraceptive coverage
from the employer’s healthcare plan and also the establishment of
a separate payment by the insurance provider. Under the
exemption, the insurance firm was not to impose any cost sharing
on the employer, the employee, or the healthcare plan for the
separate coverage. Not eligible for this accommodation however,
35
were for-profit corporations (“business corporations”).
Three business corporations, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
Mardel, Inc., and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation, and
their owners challenged the contraceptive mandate, including
36
under RFRA. Enacted in response to the 1990 Supreme Court
37
decision in Employment Division v. Smith, RFRA provides that
the government “shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
38
general applicability.” There is an exception to this prohibition
if the government “demonstrates that application of the burden
to the person––(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
39
compelling governmental interest.” The law, as amended,
broadly protects “any exercise of religion, whether or not
40
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” While
the term “person” is not defined in the statute, the Dictionary Act
states that, “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,
35. Throughout, I will refer to these as business corporations. State law varies on
whether a business corporation is defined as “for-profit.” See Johnson & Millon, supra
note 12, at n.32.
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (“[I]n Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify
burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion”).
37. Id. at § 2000bb (b)(1)–(2) (RFRA, was designed to “restore the compelling
interest test . . . and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion
is substantially burdened; and . . . to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious
exercise is substantially burdened by government”).
38. Id. at § 2000bb-1(a).
39. Id. at § 2000bb-1(b). The law also provides that “[a] person whose religious
exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim
or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.”
Id. at § 2000bb-1(c).
40. Id. at § 2000cc–5(7)(A).
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unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and
‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations, firms,
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
41
individuals.”
The owners of the three corporations claimed to have sincere
Christian beliefs that life begins at conception and that it would
violate such beliefs and substantially burden their exercise of
religion to provide employees of the corporations they owned and
controlled with access to contraceptive methods and devices that
42
they believe operated after conception. The Hahns and
Conestoga Wood Specialties, the corporation they owned and
controlled, asked the federal district court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania to enjoin application of the contraceptive
mandate so that the corporation would not have to provide the
43
four contraceptive devices. The district court denied their
request for a preliminary injunction and the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed, agreeing with the position of HHS, holding
that a for-profit corporation could not “engage in religious
exercise and that the Hahns in their personal capacities had no
44
mandate imposed upon them.” The Third Circuit decision
focused on the separateness between the corporate entity and the
human beings associated with it, writing that:
General business corporations do not, separate and apart from
the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or
employees, exercise religion. They do not pray, worship,
observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivated actions
separate and apart from the intention and direction of their
45
individual actors.
46

The Greens and the corporations they owned and controlled,
Hobby Lobby and Mardel, were initially denied a preliminary
41. 1 U.S.C. § 1.
42. The Hahn family comprised parents and children who owned voting stock of
Conestoga and controlled the board. One of the sons served as its president and CEO. 134
S. Ct. at 2764.
43. Failure to comply with the contraceptive mandate would have apparently
resulted in penalties of about $33 million per year for Conestoga. 134 S. Ct. at 2775–76.
44. 134 S. Ct. at 2776. Hobby Lobby apparently faced an approximately $475 million
per year fine and Mardel about $15 million.
45. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir.), rev’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
46. The Green family controlled the stock of Hobby Lobby and Mardel (both
Oklahoma business corporations) through a family trust for which the family members
were trustees and beneficiaries. Family members served on the board of directors and also
as senior management of the corporations.. 134 S. Ct. at 2765 (including n.15).
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injunction by the federal district court for the Western District of
Oklahoma The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
however, finding that the Greens were “persons” under RFRA
and that they had established a likelihood of success on their
RFRA claim.
The cases were consolidated and the Supreme Court ruled in
a 5-4 decision in favor of all three business corporations,
concluding that by using the term “persons” to include
corporations, the law protected the religious liberty of the human
beings that own and control them. And the Court attributed to
47
each corporation the religious beliefs of their respective owners.
While the majority decision noted that these were closely held
corporations, it did not exclude the possibility of other firms,
including publicly held ones from being persons under RFRA.
Implicit in its decision was the notion that for religious identity
purposes, human owners are coextensive with the entity itself and
have control over its exercise of religion.
Thus the Court did not appear to pay heed to the nearly
century old work by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means
concerning the separation of ownership from control in the
48
modern corporation, nor did it expressly acknowledge that the
largest U.S. corporations are publicly traded with more than
seventy percent of corporate shares held by institutions, not
49
human beings. Indeed, as described below, blurring the line
between the corporate entity and its owners was an essential
condition toward finding that the corporations were each persons
for purposes of RFRA.
The Hobby Lobby decision stirred up longstanding debates
50
about the nature of corporate personhood, purpose, and power.
Some scholars praised the decision as affirming that business
47. Garrett, supra note 32, at 144 (“The Hobby Lobby majority suggested that
corporations can exercise religion on behalf of their owners, or as a pass-through for the
rights of the owners.”).
48. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODOERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (2d ed. 1991).
49. See BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR. & STEPHEN DAVIS, ARE INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS PART OF THE PROBLEM OR PART OF THE SOLUTION? KEY DESCRIPTIVE AND
PRESCRIPTIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT SHAREHOLDERS’ ROLE IN U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY
MARKETS 9 (Oct. 2011) (citing CONFERENCE BOARD, THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION
(2010)); Jill E. Fisch, Symposium, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1963 (2010) (“[A]s of the end of 2007, institutional investors
owned an unprecedented 76.4% of the largest 1000 corporations.”).
50. Corporate law scholars vary on whether they see the opinion as affirming,
defeating, or furthering existing theories.
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corporations were free to pursue non-profit maximizing goals, 51
whereas others condemned it for allowing businesses to use claims
of conscience to avoid complying with the law. Numerous scholars
wondered how Justice Alito could have brushed aside a
foundational tenet of corporate law—that the corporation is
52
separate from its owners, particularly given the carefully argued
amicus curiae brief submitted by forty-four law corporate and
53
criminal professors on this very topic.
Many critics considered the practical implications of the
Hobby Lobby decision, worrying that it provided a pathway for
any and all types of business corporations unilaterally to deprive
employees of legal protections and circumvent the democratic
process. Questions arose as to the limits of the holding. Would
employers—as HHS and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent
suggested—attempt to exclude from healthcare insurance
54
coverage blood transfusions or vaccinations? Would Hobby
Lobby’s holding reach outside the health insurance context and

51. Johnson & Millon, supra note 12, at 1 (“Rejecting the federal government’s
position that for-profit business corporations cannot ‘exercise religion’ because their sole
purpose is to make money, the Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. construed
state corporate law as permitting a broad array of non-monetary objectives.”); see also 134
S. Ct. at 2771–72 (“Some lower court judges have suggested that RFRA does not protect
for-profit corporations because the purpose of such corporations is simply to make money.
This argument flies in the face of modern corporate law. ‘Each American jurisdiction today
either expressly or by implication authorizes corporations to be formed under its general
corporation act for any lawful purpose or business.” 1 J. Cox & T. Hazen, Treatise of the
Law of Corporations §4:1, p. 224 (3d ed. 2010).”)
52. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Hobby Lobby, “Unconstitutional Conditions,” and
Corporate Law Mistakes, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2014 9:07 PM), http://www. scotus
blog.com/2014/06/hobby-lobby-symposium-hobby-lobby-unconstitutional-conditions-and
-corporate-law-mistakes/ (“A distinction between shareholders and the company lies at
the very foundation of corporate law. . . . Hobby Lobby’s presumption that shareholders
can be seen as distinct from the company for purposes of, say, limited liability, but
identified with the company for purposes of religious freedom changes the nature of the
government benefit itself”).
53. See Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Support of Petitioners,
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Nos. 13-354 & 13-356 (Jan. 28, 2014) (“Allowing a
corporation, through either shareholder vote or board resolution, to take on and assert the
religious beliefs of its shareholders in order to avoid having to comply with a generallyapplicable law with a secular purpose is fundamentally at odds with the entire concept of
incorporation.”). Note that this author is a signatory to that brief.
54. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting (“Would the exemption the
Court holds RFRA demands for employers with religious grounded objections to the use
of certain contraceptives extend to employers’ religiously grounded objections to blood
transfusions (Jehovah’s Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived
from pigs, including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain
Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among others)?”).
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permit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
55
orientation or gender identity?
Others disappointed in the decision included members of
faith-based organizations, including the Anti-Defamation
League, who asserted that given our “increasingly diverse
workplaces,” allowing “for-profit employers to impose their
owners’ religious beliefs on employees” undermined religious
56
liberty. Linking the case to Citizens United, some decried what
they viewed as the Court’s further expansion of the rights of large
business enterprises in the democratic process. While the Court
only ruled on statutory grounds, opponents viewed the opinion as
establishing the framework for a future ruling that business
corporations have rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.
Naturally, missing from those initial reactions was a deeper
study of the opinion. A more deliberate and perhaps optimistic
reading suggests that by drawing a distinction for statutory
purposes between closely-held corporations and others (that do
not share the same unified ownership and control features),
Hobby Lobby may have provided a tool for limiting some
corporate constitutional rights.
However, in coming up with such a test, we must be mindful
that the Court did not actually define the term “closely-held
corporation” nor did it limit its holding to just that category of
entities. Thus a diagnostic test or “Hobby Lobby Tool” would
need to be based upon the particular conditions and attributes
recognized in the majority opinion. Such a task is not merely
theoretical, but necessary now, in light of the requirement that
HHS come up with a means for providing an exemption to the
contraceptive mandate for certain business corporations.
Drawing on that process, we might also arrive at test that could be
adapted to other corporate personhood rights.
Use of such a Hobby Lobby Tool might result in the
reduction or non-recognition of particular rights for certain
business corporations. Most obviously, the decision invites us to
revisit those constitutional rights the Court has recognized based
upon the theory that a corporation is an association of owners who
55. Elizabeth Deutsch, What Does Hobby Lobby Mean for LGBT Employment
Discrimination?, FEMINISTING, (July 3, 2014), http://feministing.com/2014/07/03/whatdoes-hobby-lobby-mean-for-lgbt-employment-discrimination/.
56. See, e.g., Letter from Anti-Defamation League to Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, Department of Health and Human Services on Comment Solicited for
CMS-9940-P (Oct. 21, 2014) (published in the Federal Register on Aug. 27, 2014).
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are natural persons 57 and that those persons should not forfeit
their rights simply because they choose to associate together (as
owners) in a corporate form. This theory was articulated in
Citizens United, but is also central to the holding in Hobby Lobby.
II. CRAFTING A “HOBBY LOBBY TOOL”
Using the Hobby Lobby decision to limit corporate rights is
not an ivory-tower exercise. It is a very practical pursuit. In light
of the decision, HHS has proposed a rule to provide an exemption
from the contraceptive mandate for certain business corporations.
Both this proposed rulemaking and comment letters submitted in
response demonstrate efforts to convert the Court’s reasoning
into a useful diagnostic test. This section will discuss three
comment letters submitted by separate groups of law professors.
Before doing so, however, Alito’s majority opinion will first be
examined to identify the three conditions that were arguably
necessary toward the determination that a business corporation
could be a person under RFRA with the personal religious belief
of the owners attributed to the corporation. By comparing the
language in Hobby Lobby to the alternatives offered by the
groups of law professors, we can arrive at what the elements
would be for the Hobby Lobby Tool. Finally, this section will
propose an adaptable tool that could apply to previously
recognized corporate constitutional rights.
A. THREE CONDITIONS
Three conditions can be identified that appear instrumental
in the Court’s finding that business corporations could exercise
religion as persons under RFRA. First, the Court looked-through
each corporate entity to identify human owners and treated those
owners as co-extensive with the corporation. This required the
Court to ignore the “separateness” that state corporate law
58
recognizes between a corporation and its owners for purposes
including shielding shareholders from personal liability for the
entity’s debts. The decision also appears to rest upon a second
condition. Only because the identified human owners held (or
agree to share) the same sincere religious beliefs could those
beliefs be attributed to the corporate entity. Finally, it seems that
57. Conversely, as discussed herein, there is the less rational possibility that those
“purely personal” rights that the Court has denied to corporations generally would
somehow now be granted to closely-held ones.
58. See Greenfield, supra note 52.
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only because the owners had the power to and actually did openly
operate the corporation in accordance with those beliefs, did the
Court conclude the beliefs of the owners could be attributed to
the corporate entity. With all three conditions present, the Court
could determine that the contraceptive mandate substantially
burdened the sincere religious beliefs of each corporation.
Arguably, to be deemed a person under RFRA, a corporation
would not need to be closely held, so long as each of these
conditions were met. Conversely, not all closely-held corporations
would automatically be considered persons under RFRA, as they
would not necessarily demonstrate all three conditions. Evidence
from the decision to support the necessity of each of these
conditions is set out below.
Although Justice Alito wrote in the majority opinion that the
59
notion of corporate separateness was “quite beside the point,”
the decision to look through the corporate form to the individual
human owners is the logical and legal foundation upon which the
decision rests. Very clearly, the holding in Hobby Lobby depends
upon the three business corporations being family-run and
owned. As the opinion stated, “In holding that the HHS mandate
is unlawful, we reject HHS’s argument that the owners of the
companies forfeited all RFRA protection when they decided to
organize their businesses as corporations rather than sole
60
proprietorships or general partnerships.” In this instance, the
Court sees the business as co-extensive with the owners. This
conceptualization appears throughout the decision, including in
statements such as “Congress did not discriminate in this way
against men and women who wish to run their businesses as forprofit corporations in the manner required by their religious
61
beliefs.”
62
Much to the dismay of many corporate law professors,
Justice Alito conflated the corporate entity itself with the various
human beings associated with it. In response to the Third Circuit’s

59. 134 S. Ct. at 2768 .
60. Id. at 2759.
61. Id.
62. To other legal scholars, this was far from controversial. See Brian Leiter,
Constitutional Law, Moral Judgment, and the Supreme Court as Super-Legislature (January
10, 2015), U. of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 519 (deeming the following one
of the three “banal” aspects of the decision: “that the free exercise of religion of a closely
held corporation is not meaningfully distinguishable from the free exercise of religion by
the individuals who closely own the corporation.”), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2547972 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2547972.

IS HOBBY LOBBY A TOOL_FINAL DRAFT III (DO NOT DELETE)

418

7/8/2015 10:56 AM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:403

assertion that separateness matters, 63 Justice Alito wrote: “All of
this is true—but quite beside the point. Corporations, ‘separate
and apart from’ the human beings who own, run, and are
64
employed by them, cannot do anything at all.” With regard to
free-exercise rights, however, Justice Alito narrows his scope. It is
not employees’ religious beliefs that are attributed to the
corporation; it is only the owners’. With these rights the Court
looks through to the owners, and does not look around to the
managers or employees.
This look-through approach is apparent in a final sentence of
a long passage explaining corporate personhood rights (whether
statutory or constitutional) as being anchored in or deriving from
human beings associated with the corporation. The opinion reads:
“As we will show, Congress provided protection for people like
the Hahns and Greens by employing a familiar legal fiction: It
65
included corporations within RFRA’s definition of ‘persons.’”
The opinion continues on to qualify this statement as if addressing
a skeptical public audience. “But it is important to keep in mind
that the purpose of this fiction is to provide protection for human
beings. A corporation is simply a form of organization used by
human beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law
specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including
shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a
66
corporation in one way or another.”
The Court aligns each listed right of a corporation with some
natural person. “When rights, whether constitutional or statutory,
are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights
67
of these people.” For each right mentioned the Court identifies
one or more stakeholders all of whom appear to be natural
persons. As Justice Alito explains:
For example, extending Fourth Amendment protection to
corporations protects the privacy interests of employees and
others associated with the company. Protecting corporations
from government seizure of their property without just
compensation protects all those who have a stake in the
corporations’ financial well-being. And protecting the freeexercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga,

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

724 F.3d 377, 385.
134 S. Ct. at 2768.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the humans who
68
own and control those companies.

The last sentence in the above paragraph demonstrates that
in the Court’s view, free-exercise rights of corporations protect
the owners as opposed to the employees or other human
stakeholders. It also suggests that it only applies to the extent the
owners actually “control” the entity. While Justice Alito
proclaims that separateness is “quite beside the point,” this
passage above shows the opposite. Ignoring separateness was
entirely the point. The Hobby Lobby decision depends upon a
particular view of corporate personality—as an association of
individual owners—to find justification. Looking-through to
owners is more easily accomplished with family-owned and
operated businesses, and is perhaps what the court means with the
69
descriptor “closely held.”
Justice Alito’s opinion also supports the need for the
aforementioned second and third conditions—that the owners
shared (or agreed) to share the same religious beliefs, and that
they had the authority and power to operate the corporation
according to those beliefs. For example, the Court mentions that
the owners of each corporation agreed to commit the entity to
fulfill their own religious objectives. Each member of the Green
family had “signed a pledge to run the businesses in accordance
with the family’s religious beliefs and to use the family assets to
70
support Christian ministries.” And, the Court noted that the
Hahn family provided evidence of the Conestoga’s boardadopted statement of the Hahn family belief that “human life
71
begins at conception.”
This evidence that being a “person” under RFRA turned also
on conditions two (owners sharing or agreeing to share the same
religious beliefs) and three (owners operating the corporation in
accordance with those beliefs) is seen where the Court suggests
that not all corporations will be considered persons under RFRA.
Dismissing HHS’s concern that publicly traded firms like IBM or
General Electric could claim to have sincere beliefs, Justice Alito
68. Id.
69. The Court suggests that drawing a line between closely held and other
corporations for corporate free-exercise rights purposes is not a proper method. See. note
8 supra. As such, we need to look at the attributes of the three corporate litigants, not
merely the fact that they are closely held, to determine which types of corporations could
be persons under RFRA and which could not. Not all closely-held corporations would pass
the test and some that are not closely held could.
70. 134 S. Ct. at 2766.
71. Id. at 2764.
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responds that, “it seems unlikely that the sort of corporate giants
to which HHS refers will often assert RFRA claims . . . numerous
72
practical restraints would likely prevent that from occurring.”
He offers the following reasoning, “[T]he idea that unrelated
shareholders—including institutional investors with their own set
of stakeholders—would agree to run a corporation under the
same religious beliefs seems improbable.” The Court also notes
that “we have no occasion in these cases to consider RFRA’s
applicability to such companies. The companies in the cases
before us are closely held corporations, each owned and
controlled by members of a single family, and no one has disputed
the sincerity of their religious beliefs.” This provides additional
evidence that at the very least, ownership and control by a limited
number of identifiable human beings is essential toward claiming
personhood under RFRA.
B. COMMENT LETTERS TO HHS
Columbia Law School professor Katherine Franke and
research fellow Kara Loewentheil organized a comment letter to
73
HHS. The letter, which was signed by more than forty additional
law professors, sought to provide a “thorough, practical and clear
set of guidelines for for-profit entities wishing to seek an
accommodation that is consistent with state corporate law
74
principles and the Hobby Lobby ruling in both spirit and form.”
The letter distilled the key features of the closely-held business
corporations that prevailed in the case. It was careful to note that
the Court was not likely being exact in its use of the “closely-held”
descriptor, but instead meant to evoke “a perception of intimacy
of ownership rather than a reliance on a formalistic statutory form
75
in state law.” Under the umbrella of “identity of interests”
between the three corporations and their owners, the Franke
letter highlighted the following attributes of all three respondent
corporations:
(1) they were entirely family-owned, (2) they consisted of a
small number of shareholders, (3) the shareholders and the
board
of
directors
were
co-extensive,
(4)
the
family/shareholders/directors were unanimous in their
religious convictions, (5) the family/shareholders/directors
72. 134 S. Ct. at 2774.
73. Law Professors’ Comment Letter on Definition, supra note 23 (This author is a
signatory to the comment letter).
74. Id. at 11.
75. Id. at 3
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were unanimous in wishing to seek an exemption from the
contraceptive coverage requirement, and (6) the companies
had long held themselves out to employees, customers, and the
public as companies operating under religious principles that
constrained their business behavior in accordance with the
religious beliefs of equity holders/owners, thereby providing
76
concrete evidence of their religious commitments.

Accordingly, the Franke letter recommended that HHS “limit any
accommodation for for-profit entities only to those companies
that meet each of these criteria, including being family-owned; the
close ties between family members who share a religious faith and
operate a religiously-influenced business are the best assurance of
the close nexus on which corporate religious rights depend.”
However, the letter also offered an alternative to limiting the
eligibility for an accommodation to just family-owned businesses.
It suggested the HHS might instead limit the accommodation to
entities:
(1) with a limited number of equity holders/owners, (2) that
demonstrate religious commitment, and (3) submit evidence of
unanimous consent of equity holders to seek an
77
accommodation on an annual basis.

These three requirements parallel the three conditions upon
which the decision arguably depended. They acknowledge a
corporate ownership, governance and operational structure that
gives the owners full knowledge and control over the religious
identity and commitment of the corporation.
Six professors at the University of California, Berkeley
78
School of Law submitted a comment letter recommending how
HHS could determine what for-profit entities should be able to
claim exemptions from the ACA contraceptive mandate. The
Berkeley letter asserted that Hobby Lobby “held that the nexus
of identity between several closely-held, for-profit corporations
and their shareholders holding ‘a sincere religious belief that life
begins at conception’ was sufficiently close to justify granting such
corporations an exemption” from the ACA’s contraceptive
mandate under RFRA. The letter proposed that the exemption
76. Id. at 2.
77. Id. at 2–3.
78. Robert P. Bartlett III, Richard M. Buxbaum, Stavros Gadinis, Justin McCrary,
Steven Davidoff Solomon, & Eric L. Talley, Comment on the Definition of “Eligible
Organization” for Purposes of Coverage of Certain Preventive Services under the
Affordable Care Act, Oct. 8, 2014 [hereinafter Berkeley Letter on Definition], available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507305 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2507305.
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be available only if a corporation and its shareholders certify that
they “have a unity in identity and interests, and therefore the
79
corporation should be viewed as the shareholders’ alter ego.”
80
Accordingly such entities could be vulnerable to veil piercing
whereby the shareholders could be personally liable for the debts
of the corporation, as one example.
The letter suggested that shareholders would need to affirm
that “(1) the corporate entity has an expressed religious identity
or principle, (2) this principle should be recognized because the
corporate entity is the alter ego of the shareholders with
indistinguishable interests and commitments, and (3) the
assertion of this principle does not conflict with the corporation’s
81
governing documents or state law.” This approach also aligns
with the three conditions (discussed above) upon which the
decision in Hobby Lobby was arguably based.
Another letter entitled, “Comments on the HHS’ Flawed
82
Post-Hobby Lobby Rules,” submitted by seven law professors,
differs substantially from the other two. The authors contend that
because under state corporate law the board of directors direct
the business of the corporation, the shareholders should have
little influence over a corporation’s religious identity. It would be
the directors, not the shareholders, who should decide whether a
corporation would or would not “exercise religion.”
These commentators recommend that HHS create a safe
harbor under which an eligible organization would be “any
corporation that is not a publicly reporting company under
federal securities laws, the board of directors of which has

79. Id. at 2.
80. Veil-piercing is a court-made exception to one of the central tenets of state
corporate law, of limited personal liability for shareholders. For example, § 6.22(b) of the
Model Business Corporation Act provides that “a shareholder of a corporation is not
personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become
personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct;” also see ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS
PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 157 (2013) (“With respect to large corporations
with many public shareholders, the business entity is pierced to find individual equity
owners liable very rarely, if ever.”).
81. Berkeley Letter on Definition at 6 -7.
82. Lyman Johnson, David Millon, Stephen Bainbridge, Ronald J. Colombo, Brett
McDonnell, Alan J. Meese, & Nathan B., Oman, Comment on the Definition of “Eligible
Organization” for Purposes of Coverage of Certain Preventive Services under the
Affordable Care Act, Oct. 20, 2014 (also titled, Comments on the HHS’ Flawed PostHobby Lobby Rules) [hereinafter Flawed Rules Letter], available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2512860.
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determined will exercise religion in its business affairs.”. 83 The
safe harbor approach would also mean that other firms (including
reporting companies) could still seek to gain eligibility for the
exemption.
Though the Court opined that “protecting the free-exercise
rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel
protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control
those companies,” these commentators saw limited to no direct
input available to shareholders. Dissenting shareholders could
“remove directors at the annual election of directors or at a
special meeting held for that purpose.” Yet, removing members
of the board of directors at large publicly held corporations is
extremely difficult. Generally candidates for the board are
84
nominated by a committee of the board and typically run
85
uncontested. With plurality voting, a director need only receive
one vote to get elected and even where majority voting is in place,
if an incumbent nominee does not receive a majority, he or she is
still not required to step down.
The seven commentators also stated that “Absent an unusual
charter or by-law provision, directors are the key decision-makers
in corporations and neither they nor shareholders (where they do
get to vote) must act with unanimity.” They explained Justice
Alito’s repeated use of language such as “if owners agree” to
86
mean at the very most a “simple majority vote.”
Considering together the majority opinion and the comment
letters, we can observe that the Court indeed meant to restrict –
based upon ownership, control, and religious commitment – the
types of corporations that could be considered persons under
RFRA and thus be eligible for an exemption from the
contraceptive mandate. Thus a sound standard would require that
business corporations can only be considered persons under
83. If a corporation met the conditions of the safe harbor, such as having no more
than 2,000 shareholders (which could be institutional investors) it would be eligible for the
exemption.
84. See LINDA O. SMIDDY & LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 352 (7th ed. 2010)
(“Historically, as a matter of general practice, a corporation’s incumbent board nominates
directors for elections and presents its nominations in annual proxy statements produced
at the corporation’s expense.”).
85. See Paul E. Fischer et al., Investor Perceptions of Board Performance: Evidence
from Uncontested Director Elections 1 (Working Paper, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=928843 (“Every year the vast majority of publicly traded firms’
shareholders vote to approve members of the board of directors in uncontested elections
(i.e., elections not involving proxy fights or vote-no campaigns).”).
86. Flawed Rules Letter at 9.
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RFRA if (1) the court looks-through the entity to see human
owners whose free exercise rights are to be protected and who are
intimately linked to the identity, ownership and control of the
entity; (2) such owners share or agreed to share the same sincere
religious beliefs as evidenced by consent of at least a majority (and
possible all owners); and (3) owners openly operating the
87
corporation in accordance with those beliefs.
III. USING A HOBBY LOBBY TOOL TO CURTAIL
CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING RIGHTS
This section contemplates whether a form of Hobby Lobby
Tool used for statutory free-exercise rights could apply in a
constitutional rights context. As the Court has not yet found that
corporations have free-exercise rights under the First
Amendment, we must search for another example. A Supreme
Court decision in which corporate constitutional rights were
recognized based upon looking-through the entity to the owners
would function well for this purpose. Citizens United is such a
case. This is a good choice as it has quite a bit in common with
88
Hobby Lobby.
A. CITIZENS UNITED
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court greatly expanded the
First Amendment rights of corporations to engage in political
spending activities. The Court’s reasoning included an
assumption similar to the thinking in Hobby Lobby—that a
corporation was an association of individual owners who should
each not lose their rights simply because they joined together in
corporate form to exercise them. As such, corporations deserved
89
the same political “speech” rights under the First Amendment
as real people. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was clear on
this point and rejected the notion that the decision depended
upon treating the corporation itself as a person. As Boston
87. Compare similarities and differences of these three conditions to Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Using Reverse Veil Piercing to Vindicate the Free Exercise Rights of
incorporated Employers, 16 GREEN BAG 2d 235 (2013).
88. Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes, and Religion: The Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga Contraceptive Cases 65 S. CAR. L. REV. 1, at 36 (2013) (“Hence, Hobby Lobby
is more akin to Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, in which the Court
recognized corporate speech rights as being personal to the speaker, but allowing a
corporation to assert them because a corporation can speak.”).
89. Without endorsing the notion that spending money on politics equates with
speech, this Article simply acknowledges that the Court has made this connection
beginning with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (“virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money”).
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College Law School Professor Kent Greenfield recently
reaffirmed, “The court did not . . . say that Citizens United, the
corporate entity, had rights that were violated. What it said was
that Citizens United was an association of citizens, and in
constraining that organization’s ability to . . . to release its movie,
90
it was violating the rights of its members.”
The Court in Citizens United assumed that a corporation
does express the voice of empowered shareholders who could
monitor and object to political spending decisions that depart
from their interests. The Court expected that disclosure of
91
corporate political spending would be prompt and complete.
With these assumptions in mind, the Court found unconstitutional
legislation that had prohibited the use of unlimited corporate
treasury funds to influence elections.
The Court left open the question of which individuals
associated with the corporation would have the power to decide
how and when to engage in political spending. Recognizing the
possibility that corporate managers might spend in ways that were
misaligned with shareholders’ interest, Justice Kennedy suggested
that any abuses could be corrected through “the procedures of
92
corporate democracy.” Congress, state legislatures, and the
SEC, for example, would have a role in enhancing such
procedures to cure disclosure shortages and to help enhance how
shareholders could better exercise their rights through their
corporation.
The Court also quite clearly created an opening for further
disclosure of corporate political spending. While only five justices
signed on to most of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, eight joined part
IV which held that mandating further disclosure of corporate
political spending would be permissible under the Constitution.

90. Should McDonald’s & Monsanto Have the Same Rights as People? A Debate on
Corporate Personhood, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Mar. 13, 2015), transcript and video available
at
http://www.democracynow.org/2015/3/13/should_mcdonalds_monsanto_have_the_
same.
91. In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote that “[w]ith the advent of the
Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the
information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their
positions and supporters.”Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370.
92. 130 S. Ct. at 911.
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B. APPLYING A HOBBY LOBBY TOOL TO LIMIT
CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING
This next subsection considers whether the three putative
Hobby Lobby pre-conditions to finding corporate statutory freeexercise rights could apply to corporate constitutional rights. In
particular it examines whether a Hobby Lobby Tool could be
adapted to apply to corporate First Amendment political
spending rights that were recognized in Citizens United. This
inquiry has practical implications. Just as HHS is working to
establish criteria to divide those business corporations that may
gain a religious exemption to the ACA’s contraceptive mandate
and those that may not, a legislator might wish to craft a bill that
draws a line between business corporations that may engage in
unlimited political spending and those that may not.
This is an appropriate analogy given that both personhood
rights under RFRA and corporate political spending rights under
the First Amendment are look-through rights. They appear to
derive from the owners that associate in the corporate form, and
not from the entity itself or from other stakeholders. Moreover,
to the extent that such a tool would encourage disclosure and
shareholder voting rights, it would align well with the Court’s
invitation to enact disclosure requirements. It would also reflect
the Court’s recognition that shareholders’ interests in meaningful
“procedures of corporate” democracy that would help check
managerial abuses,
However, directly applying a Hobby Lobby Tool used for
purposes of free-exercise rights to political spending rights is
slightly awkward. We would need to adapt the attributes of lookthrough, consent and disclosure to fit the corporate political
spending context. The elements of this adapted tool could include
(1) look-through to identify human owners that are coextensive
with the corporation; (2) notice and consent of owners to engage
in particular political spending (on a majority, supermajority, or
unanimous basis); and (3) public disclosure of the spending. A
new statute that made these elements preconditions to receiving
an exemption from a general prohibition on corporate political
spending could be viewed as appropriate “procedures of
corporate democracy” designed to mitigate the agency problem
that arises from the separation of ownership from control. And, it
would align well with the three conditions set out in Hobby
Lobby.
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Whether an adaptable Hobby Lobby Tool like this one could
be used to curtail corporate political speech rights might depend
upon whether a future Court majority would view the Hobby
Lobby decision as a shift from or clarification of Citizens United.
It may be too bold quite yet to expect the Court to uphold a
statute enacted that restored verbatim the pre-Citizen’s
restrictions on corporate political spending found in BCRA
simply because it provided carve-outs. However, at some point, a
Court could take this approach, quite rationally.
One way to nearly meet the three conditions of the Hobby
Lobby Tool would be to restrict corporate political spending to
those entities that on an annual basis provide advance notice and
obtain the unanimous vote of shareholders (including
institutional shareholders) to support political spending activities.
Short of unanimous support, supermajority approval by
shareholders (by voting shares) plus oversight by independent
directors, as suggested by corporate law scholars Lucian Bebchuk
93
and Robert Jackson, would be advisable. Another method might
be to only allow political spending by those corporations that have
charters that (or that are incorporated in states that) require the
consent of the human beings who own shares. Such a method
might require unanimous consent, or if not could be a
supermajority or majority vote on a per capita or per share basis.
There are a variety of related approaches, some of which are
being attempted by policymakers. For example, in early 2015,
94
Maryland state senator, Jamie Raskin introduced a bill that if
enacted would require Maryland corporations to disclose on their
95
websites political expenditures within 48 hours. It would also
require corporations to obtain annual shareholder consent (by a
93. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate
Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923 (2013); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr.,
Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 84–85, 97–107 (2010)
(suggesting that “lawmakers should develop special rules to govern who may make
political speech decisions on behalf of corporations” and that because Citizens United
expanded “the scope of constitutionally protected corporate political speech,” “the need
for such rules [is] all the more pressing.” Such proposals would include the mandatory
disclosure of political expenditures subject to a supermajority of shareholders voting to
approve the spending and overseen by independent directors).
94. S.B. 153, 2015 S., 435th Sess. (Md. 2015), available at http://mgaleg.mary
land.gov/2015RS/bills/sb/sb0153f.pdf; Lasio Boyd, Jamie Raskin’s Challenge to ‘Citizens
United’, CTR. MD. BLOG (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.centermaryland.org/index.php
?option=com_easyblog&view=entry&id=1191.
95. The term “political expenditure” is defined to mean “a contribution, gift,
transfer, disbursement, or promise of money or a thing of value to promote or assist in the
promotion of the success or defeat of a candidate, political party, or question in any state
or federal election.” S.B. 153, 2015 S., 435th Sess. (Md. 2015).
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majority of votes entitled to be cast) of the political expenditure
96
budget as well as consent to where the money or property is
directed, such as specific candidates, causes, parties, and PACs.
Senator Raskin has suggested that if certain institutional investors
are not legally permitted to cast their votes approving the
direction of political expenditures, this may result in the failure to
gain a majority approval and thus prohibit the campaign-related
97
spending.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Hobby Lobby decision arguably provides tools to curtail
certain corporate constitutional rights. The rights that could be
subject to restriction are those that the Court has recognized as
deriving from looking through the entity to the owners. This
would include the First Amendment corporate political spending
rights recognized in Citizens United. A statute should be upheld
that limits corporate political spending to those entities where
there is an identity of interest between the human owners and the
corporation, where there is majority shareholder consent to the
specific spending, and where there is public disclosure of such
spending.
Even if a future Court majority might be willing to rely on a
Hobby Lobby Tool to curtail corporate political spending or other
corporate constitutional rights, this may be an undesirable
response to a bigger problem. Treating shareholders as “owners”
and conflating owners with the corporation is not fully supported
98
as a matter of law or policy. Even with shareholder approval of
political spending (or to the exercise of other First Amendment
or statutory personhood rights), we should be concerned that the
96. See S.B. 153, 2015 S., 435 Sess. (Md. 2015).
97. Jamie B. Raskin, A Shareholder Solution to ‘Citizens United’, WASH. POST. (Oct.
3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-shareholder-solution-to-citizensunited/2014/10/03/5e07c3ee-48be-11e4-b72e-d60a9229cc10_story.html (“I am introducing
legislation . . . that will require managers of Maryland-registered corporations who wish to
engage in political spending for their shareholders to post all political expenditures on
company Web sites within 48 hours and confirm that any political spending fairly reflects
the explicit preference of shareholders owning a majority interest in the company. Further,
if no ‘majority will’ of the shareholders can form to spend money for political candidates—
because most shares are owned by institutions forbidden to participate in partisan
campaigns—then the corporation will be prohibited from using its resources on political
campaigns.”).
98. STOUT, supra note 26 at 93; see also Pollman, supra note 6 (questions persist as
to “whether the corporation has a separate existence, reified or real, from the persons
connected with it and whether the emphasis in understanding the nature of the corporation
should be on the separate legal entity or on the aggregate of individuals involved.”).
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First Amendment could be used to undermine or evade
99
regulation. Importantly, there are more direct critiques of
100
Such approaches could be used restore
Citizens United.
campaign finance limits or gain support for public funding of
elections. Finally, relying on a Hobby Lobby Tool might result in
the expansion instead of the contraction of corporate
constitutional rights. Perhaps rights previously denied to
corporations due to their being personal in nature could now be
expanded with look-through treatment. With those objections in
mind, on balance, however, it seems wise to explore legislation
that prohibits certain corporate political spending with
exemptions for those corporations that meet the three-part test
of: (1) look-through to identify owners that are coextensive with
the corporation; (2) notice and consent of shareholders (on at
least a majority basis) to engage in particular political spending;
and (3) public disclosure of the spending.

99. Piety, supra note 27, at 366 (“[T]here is almost no case that can’t, with creative
lawyering, be turned into a First Amendment case and many of these cases depend upon
some version of the equal protection argument.”)
100. David A. Westbrook, If Not a Commercial Republic? Political Economy in the
United States after Citizens United, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 35, 36 (2011) (“What makes
Citizens United disturbing is that the case signals a rupture in our constitutional tradition”);
Coates, supra note 29, at 234 (“[C]ommercial and corporate speech—in the most
important activities of every business, including contract formation, retention and
regulation of agents, and engaging in risk-taking activities—was pervasively regulated and
structured by law long before the modern, expansive version of the First Amendment,
which . . . was invented only recently.”); TEACHOUT, supra note 31.

